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ABSTRACT 
 
On Expressive Punishment and Holistic Desert. 
 May 2008 
Jacob Greenblum, B.A., Hampshire College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Linda Radzik 
 
Expressive theories of punishment incorporate both deontological and consequentialist 
components. The deontological element claims that punishment expresses the value of 
both victim and wrongdoer. The consequentialist element claims that punishment 
restores the victim’s and wrongdoer’s worth. In contemporary literature, however, it is 
unclear which component is given priority and therefore expressive theories appear 
ambiguous at best and inconsistent at worst. My thesis argues that expressive theories are 
cleared up and made consistent through employing a holistic notion of punitive desert. 
Holism is the view that accurate desert judgments must reference an actually obtaining 
just distribution of punishment. In my view, the expressive function is feasible only 
when desert is understood holistically and in this sense expressive theories are committed 
to giving priority to the deontological component.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Expressive theories of punishment are unique insofar as they attempt to fuse classic 
retributive and deontological premises like the desert and “respect for criminal” theses, 
or the combined view that treating criminals in accordance with their deserts respects 
their agency and thus satisfies the moral demand to be just, to the consequentialist 
premise that at least part of punishment’s justification lies in its ability to publicly 
condemn crime. At first sight, this set of premises seems at odds. How can punishment’s 
justification include both retributive and consequentialist components? Doesn’t one 
obviously take precedence over the other? My thesis argues that when understood 
holistically (i.e., when desert presumes and references justice), expressive punitive 
theories are consistent and extremely compelling. Alternatively put, I argue against the 
traditional conception of desert that posits desert prejusticially (or prior to justice and 
without reference to justice) and in favor of desert understood as a distributive concept.1  
In Chapter II I argue that the best worked out contemporary version of 
expressivist theories - Jean Hampton’s retributive theory - is ultimately unjustifiable. For 
Hampton, the aim of retribution is to restore victims through expressing their equality. 
Unfortunately, however, Hampton’s argument does not explain why retribution is 
uniquely suited to do this. In developing my criticism, I employ Joel Feinberg’s 
distinction between comparative and noncomparative justice. Comparative justice 
involves comparing at least two persons in determining what each deserves. By contrast, 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Social Philosophy. 
1 By distributive justice I mean a version of comparative justice, see Chapter IV.  
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noncomparative justice corresponds to the claims of specific persons irrespective of 
others’ claims. I show that Hampton’s justification of punishment is premised merely on 
correcting comparative inequalities rather than noncomparative inequalities. Insofar as 
restoring the victim is a response to noncomparative wrongs, I contend (1) that Hampton 
lacks an argument for how retribution responds to noncomparative injustices and 
therefore (2) that the noncomparative motivation behind Hampton’s theory is 
insufficient to justify retribution.  
I turn to Hegel in Chapter III because his theory of punishment is, like 
Hampton’s, expressive and egalitarian-inspired, however, unlike Hampton, Hegel 
employs a non-traditional desert thesis. The traditional usage of desert is prejusticial: 
desert is posited outside of and prior to justice. I argue, however, that Hegel employs 
desert as a legitimate moral concept only after just social conditions obtain. Furthermore, 
I argue that Hegel’s notion of desert shares the same moral structure as the just social 
conditions. Because just social conditions endorse taking “particularities” seriously (e.g., 
intentions and consequences), desert, for Hegel, reconciles deontological and 
consequentialist intuitions. Thus, in contradistinction to many commentators who view 
Hegel (along with Kant) as an archetypal traditional retributivist, I maintain that Hegel’s 
nuanced conception of desert makes his retributivism extremely non-traditional: Hegel 
does not think punishment (let alone proportionate punishment) is always required even 
with respect to crimes ordinarily regarded as serious.  
In Chapter IV I examine in further detail the relationship between justice and 
desert. First, I look at Samuel Scheffler’s work on holism. Holism reverses the 
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traditional claim that justice consists in treating people in accordance with their deserts. 
Instead, Scheffler argues, desert becomes a legitimate moral concept only after just 
distributions obtain and only when desert references this distribution. So far, however, 
holist scholars have limited their attention to cases of economic desert.  Second, and in 
contrast to Scheffler, I argue that punitive desert can and should be understood along 
holist principles. My argument pulls features from the previous two chapters. For 
instance, I argue that despite Hampton’s faults, her theory helps explain why desert 
claims are legitimate (i.e., can express what they are intended to express) only when they 
reference shared and just social distributions of punishment. I then argue that implicit in 
Hegel’s punitive theory is the holistic principle that desert’s legitimacy not only hinges 
on just social institutions (as we see in Chapter III) but that it also hinges on referencing 
a legal code and its corresponding punitive distribution which all properly educated 
citizens are expected to endorse.   
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CHAPTER II 
EQUALITY AND DIGNITY IN HAMPTON’S RETRIBUTIVE THEORY 
A. Introduction 
Joel Feinberg defines punishment in terms of (1) the infliction of hard treatment and (2) 
the reprobative symbolism expressed through hard treatment. Indeed, what distinguishes 
punishment from mere penalties is that punishment includes this latter element.2 When 
considering punishment’s justification, however, Feinberg skeptically claims the 
“problem of justifying punishment, when it takes this [hard] form, may really be that of 
justifying our particular symbols of infamy.”3 That is, because the reprobative function 
is distinct from hard treatment and seems to be what we really value in punishing, the 
problem of punishment’s justification reduces to defending the expression of moral 
disapproval via punishment as opposed to non-punitive methods.  
 In response to Feinberg’s observation, Jean Hampton attempts to justify 
retributive punishment by arguing that punishment is uniquely suited to reassert victims’ 
worth.4 We are required to reassert victims’ worth because wrongdoers deny their worth. 
Hampton argues that insofar as we hold egalitarian commitments, we must 
proportionately punish wrongdoers because punishment concretely reverses the unequal 
                                                 
2 Joel Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” in Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), 95-118, at 95 and 98.  
3 Ibid., 116. 
4 In Hampton’s later work, she actually claims certain non-punitive methods can reassert victims’ worth, 
that is, perform the retributive function. This chapter lacks discussion of this because my argument does 
not hinge on Hampton’s nuanced distinction between punitive and non-punitive retribution. Hence, I 
simply discuss Hampton’s retributivism according to its usual interpretation, as a theory of punishment. 
For Hampton’s mention of non-punitive retributivism, see “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: 
The Goal of Retribution” UCLA Law Review 39 (1992): 1659-1702, at 1684, 1697-98.  
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relationship between wrongdoer and victim, which the wrongdoer’s action creates. Thus, 
punishment is justified because it accomplishes the good of reestablishing equal moral 
respect.  
 In this chapter I argue against Hampton’s retributive theory. In developing my 
argument, I draw upon Feinberg’s distinction between comparative and noncomparative 
justice.5 Comparative justice involves comparative equality between at least two 
persons. Noncomparative justice involves giving each person his or her due irrespective 
of others' claims. I maintain Hampton employs both conceptions. She wants to assert 
both that victim and wrongdoer are equally morally worthy and that they have the high 
degree of value know as “dignity.” Yet, I contend Hampton only provides an argument 
for the former. This is problematic because Hampton’s retributivism aims to restore 
victims’ dignity, a noncomparative goal. Therefore, insofar as Hampton's theory is 
motivated by a claim for which she lacks an argument, I conclude her retributivism is 
unjustified. 
 
B. Hampton’s Theory: How to Properly Respond to Moral Injuries 
Before turning to Hampton’s theory proper, it behooves us to lay some necessary 
groundwork. In particular, it is crucial to highlight the difference between harms and 
wrongs. Harms are traditionally the subject of tort law and are identified with losses to 
persons’ bodies, psychologies, and capacities and which “extend over everything we are 
                                                 
5 Joel Feinberg, “Noncomparative Justice,” The Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 297-338.   
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prepared to consider to ‘belong’ to a person.” 6 In tort law, harms often, although not 
necessarily, lack intentional connotations. Thus, the main focus when responding to 
harm is on the damages themselves rather than on the intention behind the harm. 
Therefore, harms are often corrected through tort law’s primary instrument, 
compensation.  
Wrongs, by contrast, are precisely those actions that cannot be materially 
compensated even in principle and their corresponding legal domain is criminal law. 
Wrongs cannot be compensated because they are morally injurious and moral injuries 
deny persons’ intrinsic value. Because intrinsic value cannot be compared or exchanged, 
responding to them with compensatory analogues is deemed inappropriate.7 The 
conception of value Hampton assumes is the Kantian conception of human worth. On 
this view, persons cannot lose the intrinsic, equal worth they always have. This value 
generates persons’ rights. Nevertheless, Hampton maintains that it is not enough to say 
persons have this value (or rights), we must also protect this value when violated; 
indeed, saying something has intrinsic value means that it should be preserved and 
acknowledged in various ways.8 Thus, a wrong explicitly denies someone the protection 
to which her value entitles her and thereby implicitly denies her value.  
One clear example of moral injury is rape. Rapists deny victims equal status 
through rape’s degrading messages. These messages are twofold. Rape (1) says the 
victim is a mere object through treating her as one and (2) claims the rapist occupies a 
                                                 
6 Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs,” 1662.  
7 Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Writing Harms,” 1666.  
8 Ibid., 1684.  
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“higher position” relative to his victim. The rapist’s “treatment is intended to ‘mean’ 
(i.e., to be evidence of) his superiority.”9 By “higher position” Hampton means that rape 
elevates the rapist’s moral status relative to his victim. He can do to her what she cannot 
do to him. Of course, the two parties do not actually occupy different moral positions, 
according to the Kantian theory. However, the rapist’s treatment misrepresents his 
victim’s value through disrespecting her rights. He treats her as someone who lacks 
(full) rights. Similarly, the rapist misrepresents his value through exempting himself 
from the normative requirements constitutive of moral life. These representations are 
“objective” insofar as they are indexed to the  “members of the cultural community” 
who “appropriately understand” the injury’s messages.10 Thus, moral injuries exist 
independently of whether injured persons recognize their status as victims (presuming 
members of the community understand the message).11 The rape victim who lacks a 
feeling of self-worth and is thereby disabled from recognizing her rape as wrong is 
nevertheless, according to rape’s objective meaning, a morally injured person. Likewise, 
the rapist who lacks the moral awareness that his message indicates his (false) 
superiority is, nevertheless, a moral injurer.  
According to Hampton, retribution is the proper moral response to wrongs. As 
has been noted, wrongs deny victims’ value and ascribe more value to wrongdoers; in 
this sense they are false messages because they deny the true value the Kantian theory 
ascribes to persons. Retribution is the appropriate response because it corrects such false 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 1677. This quote is taken from Hampton’s discussion of a murderous farmer, however, it applies 
equally to her discussion of rape.  
10 Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Writing Harms,” 1670. 
11 Ibid., 1671. 
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claims though vindicating the victim. Punishment vindicates when it (1) re-establishes 
“the acknowledgement of the victim’s worth” and (2) repairs “the damage done to the 
victim’s ability to realize her value.”12  Punishment re-establishes acknowledgment 
through its communicative function of reasserting the victim’s value. This function 
makes all the relevant parties (and societal members) acknowledge the victim’s worth. It 
unambiguously communicates to everyone that denials of persons’ worth demand 
serious repercussions. Punishment’s reparative function works in a different way. It 
denies, “what the wrongdoer’s events have attempted to establish”13 by lowering the 
wrongdoer at the hands of the victim (represented by the state).14 This act of lowering 
repairs the damage to the victim’s ability to realize her value through partially expelling 
(e.g., via incarceration) the wrongdoer from the moral community.15 This expulsion 
repairs in a weak sense by disenabling (e.g., through incarceration) the wrongdoer from 
wronging, but it also repairs in a strong sense by upholding the victim’s rights. She, like 
her fellow persons, wields rights that carry power. She is repaired in this strong sense by 
being made legitimately powerful. Thus, she (through the state) punishes and then “the 
score is even.”16 Because the wrongdoer (and those who share his inegalitarian 
commitments) must be made to obey law and because responding to wrongs is not 
morally optional, punishment is characterized as an instrument that “strikes back” 17 in 
                                                 
12 Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Writing Wrongs,”1686. 
13 Ibid., 1686-87.  
14 Jean Hampton, “The Retributive Idea” in Jean Hampton and Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Mercy 
(New York: Cambridge, 1988) at 126. 
15 Wrongdoers cannot be totally expelled because this would violate the Kantian theory of human worth.  
16 Hampton, “The Retributive Idea,” 128. 
17 Ibid., 123.  
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defense of the victim’s value and confirms the two parties “as equal by virtue of their 
humanity.”18  
Punishment, in other words, has a telos.19 This marks one of Hampton’s core 
departures from traditional retributive theory and deserves some mention. According to 
many traditional retributivists, retribution is a bedrock moral intuition. In many 
retributive theories, this intuition is linked to the concept of desert: the judgment that 
wrongdoers deserve punishment is supposed to be sufficient to inflict just punishment. 
On this traditional view, just punishment is completely backward looking; 
proportionately responding to past wrongs guarantees justice. Hampton’s problem with 
this concept of retributive justice is that it ignores victims by only taking wrongdoers 
into account. Because the traditional view does not take victims seriously, it is unmoored 
from our egalitarian commitments, which we use to read the messages implicit in 
wrongs. According to Hampton, insofar as retribution is distinct from these 
commitments, it is not sufficiently just because it fails to highlight what makes 
wrongdoings wrong: the denial of the victim’s value and the subsequent (albeit false) 
increase in the wrongdoer’s status. At best, retribution of the merely backward-looking 
variety is legalized revenge. 
Hampton attempts to correct the problems with traditional retributive theory by 
tying desert judgments to the relationship between victims and wrongdoers and explains 
why her theory is wedded to the retributive idea (albeit, of a non-traditional type). If one 
overlooks this relationship between the two parties and punishment and instead focuses 
                                                 
18 Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs,” 1686.  
19 Hampton, “The Retributive Idea,” 123.  
 
  10
only on Hampton’s claim that punishment “denies what the wrongdoer’s events have 
attempted to establish,”20 one might wonder why punishment is required (or even 
uniquely suited) to correct the false claims implicit in wrongs. Clearly, one might think, 
the state could issue a public statement saying the wrongdoer is wrong and that in fact he 
and his victim are equal. If other media than punishment can accomplish this 
reaffirmation, why is punishment considered the privileged, or even a permissible, 
means of doing so? Perhaps, as noted in the introduction, the “problem of justifying 
punishment, when it takes this [hard] form, may really be that of justifying our particular 
symbols of infamy.”21 But, shouldn’t we pick another medium that is less prone to errors 
of measurement or at least less expensive? In other words, insofar as other non-punitive 
modes are capable of reaffirming the victim’s worth, does the retributivist position 
simply reduce to the intuition (unsubstantiated by empirical evidence or philosophical 
argument) that retribution feels like it best accomplishes this reaffirmation?  
Hampton’s victim-focused retributivism attempts to avoid this reduction. Recall 
that for Hampton, part of what makes moral injuries wrong is their (false) elevation of 
the wrongdoer through the lowering of the victim. Also recall that wrongdoers who 
commit more serious wrongs are that much further removed from their victims.22 So 
Hampton presents us with a picture where wrongdoing creates degrees of (false) moral 
difference between the two parties. Now consider Hampton’s claim that punishment 
restores equality between the two parties. It does so because punishment lowers the 
                                                 
20 Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs,” 1686-87.  
21 Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” 116.  
22 Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs,” 1690. 
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wrongdoer at the hands of the victim (represented by the state).23 Therefore just 
punishment requires proportionality because two parties are being restored.24 Because 
the two parties are on a proportionally unequal standing, only reversing the proportional 
difference will substantively restore the equality between them.25 By contrast, non-
proportional responses cannot restore equality and are therefore insufficient. For 
instance, it is insufficient for a judge to merely announce a wrongdoer’s guilt. After all, a 
wrongdoer’s action “did not just ‘say’ [his victims] were worthless relative to him, but 
also sought to make them” worthless.26 Mere announcements bear no weight on the 
moral gulf between the wrongdoer and victim. The difference between the parties is not 
born of mere words27 and therefore a purely verbal response cannot “do” anything to 
counter this difference.28 Contrary to traditional retributivists’ attempt to justify 
proportionate punishment through an abstract desert thesis that states a wrong of a 
particular type intrinsically calls for a punishment of a particular severity, Hampton 
justifies punishment through the fact that it concretely cancels (through reversing) the 
                                                 
23 Hampton, “The Retributive Idea,” 126.  
24 I return to this idea later in the chapter. I argue that proportionality presupposes a comparison between 
at least two people. Therefore, if no comparison is made, no call for proportionality can be made.  
25 Which of course excludes the principle lex talionis or “eye for en eye.” Some punishments can be 
proportionate in this strict sense, however, others certainly cannot. For example, torturing a torturer is 
morally prohibited. Strict application of this principle would violate Hampton’s Kantian ethics and she 
repeatedly distances herself from it.  
26 Hampton, “The Retributive Idea,” 126. 
27 Worth noting is the tension between Hampton’s Kantianism and her punitive argument. That is, if the 
victim and wrongdoer’s worth do not actually change, then it’s unclear why physical punishment is the 
appropriate response. In other words, it is puzzling why punishment, a physical medium (as opposed to a 
verbal medium), can respond to the non-actual change in the victim and wrongdoer’s worth.  Daniel 
Farnham, a defender of Hampton, resolves this tension by emphasizing Hampton’s view on conventions. I 
discuss Farnham’s defense in the next section.  
28 Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs,” 1686. 
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inequality between the two parties.29 Indeed, it is through proportionate punishment’s 
concrete message that the concept of it “striking back” for the victim’s value is most 
resonant.30 Through striking back, retribution restores equality.  
 
C. Critics and Defenders 
So far we have encountered two very different features of Hampton’s theory, messages 
and concrete acts (a distinction she never explicitly states). It is unclear though whether 
Hampton is mostly concerned with messages, both the wrong’s immoral message as well 
as punishment’s moral counter-message, or with real change in the world, both the real 
change the wrong produces as well as the real change punishment re-establishes. The 
following problem thus comes to light: Punishment’s function depends on which facet 
one emphasizes, however, it is uncertain which facet Hampton emphasizes more, 
messages or real changes. Recent discussion of Hampton’s theory comprises a debate 
between critics who interpret her “epistemologically,” that is, according to her stress on 
messages, and her defenders who interpret her “metaphysically,” that is, according to her 
stress on real concrete change.31 Here I briefly outline the contours of this debate.  
 First, then, the epistemological view. David Dolinko argues that Hampton’s 
justification of punishment justifies too much. Recall that for Hampton the point of 
punishment is to nullify false moral claims. Dolinko’s criticism takes its point of 
                                                 
29 Again, the traditional retributivist notion of a wrong is not relational. For Hampton, the wrong includes 
its establishment of a proportionately unequal relationship. The wrongdoer’s elevation pivots on his 
victim’s lower status.  
30 Hampton, “The Retributive Idea,” 123. 
31 These terms are principally employed by the supporter, Daniel E. Farnham. See, Daniel E. Farnham, “A 
Hegelian Theory of Retribution,” 1-20. Unpublished. Cited with approval from author.  
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departure from Hampton’s epistemological claim that wrongdoing creates false moral 
beliefs. In response to this claim, Dolinko asks, “Why should we care about nullifying 
those false moral claims?...After all, we certainly do not believe that it is imperative to 
set up a social or governmental mechanism to seek out and correct false moral claims in 
general. ”32 For instance, Hampton’s theory seems to justify throwing people in jail for 
things like publishing racist or sexist books. Hampton’s theory then has the negative 
effect of justifying curtailments of free speech, which most of us find absurd. 
Heather Gert, Michael Hand, and Linda Radzik offer another epistemological 
criticism. 33 They dispute Hampton’s assertion that punishment denies the wrongdoer’s 
false claim and sends back the true message expressing the victim’s and wrongdoer’s 
equality. Hence, their view is epistemological because it deals with the messages, 
intended for and affecting others’ beliefs, implicit in punishment and wrongs. Hampton’s 
argument that punishment provides the correct evidence of equality fails in two ways. 
(1) It presumes the victim’s initial defeat provides evidence of her moral inferiority. This 
presumption is surely incorrect though. The victim’s defeat only signifies the 
wrongdoer’s greater ability to coerce. Similarly, (2) Gert, et al. contend Hampton’s 
argument for punishment confirms this false conflation of coercive power with moral 
value, since both moral injuries and punishment provide moral evidence in the same 
way. That is, because proportionate punishment, like moral injury, gives evidence of the 
victim’s value, Hampton’s argument for punishment works only if she “accepts the 
                                                 
32 David Dolinko, “Thoughts about Retributivism.” Ethics 101 (1991): 537-559, at 551.  
33 Heather Gert, Michael Hand, and Linda Radzik, “Hampton on the Expressive Power of Punishment.” 
Journal of Social Philosophy. Vol. 35 No1, 2004, 79-90.  
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offensive premise that the demonstration of coercive power provides evidence of moral 
value.”34 Hampton’s argument, then, hinges on a premise most of us find absurd. 
Because we are surely unconvinced that a moral injury gives evidence of a victim’s 
moral inferiority, a theory of proportionate punishment seems to reinforce rather than 
correct false moral views.35  
 Gert, et al. next consider a hypothetical counter-objection. Perhaps Hampton 
might argue that Gert, et al. misunderstand her. Of course, there is no “natural” semantic 
connection between coercive power and moral value, but it is a living and forceful 
convention and we therefore cannot ignore it. Instead, we must harness this convention 
with our egalitarian aims in mind.36 Gert, et al. maintain this counter objection fails to 
justify punishment for two reasons. It fails (1) because if the message in coercive action 
is merely conventional, punishment merely reinforces the bad convention equating 
power with moral worth. Therefore, rather than call forth punishment, wrongdoing calls 
forth the need “to teach people to reject this convention.”37 This counter objection also 
fails (2) insofar as it cannot explain why punishment is uniquely suited to convey the 
equalizing message. “The fact that we can send the necessary message [of equality] by 
inflicting harm is not a justification for doing so.”38
 Daniel Farnham admits Hampton’s theory is flawed when considered from its 
epistemological standpoint, however, he defends Hampton by focusing on her 
                                                 
34 Gert, et al., “Hampton on the Expressive Power of Punishment,” 86.  
35 Ibid., 86. 
36 Ibid., 86. 
37 Ibid., 86. 
38 Ibid., 87. 
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“metaphysical” thesis, a component of her theory he claims Gert, et al. ignore.39 Citing 
the case of rape in the explication of this thesis, Farnham says,  
The violator in this case has not just given evidence for a view about human 
worth, he has made something the case in the world…In doing so, this wrongful 
action creates a state of affairs where the wrongdoer is elevated above the victim. 
That is a relational feature between the two people that supervenes on the 
conventions expressing these relations…A person who has been wronged has not 
just had false things about her expressed, she has been injured.40  
 
Therefore, a rape victim is not merely represented to society as less worthy than she in 
fact is. She is also made to live in fear and often shame. Similarly, the rapist does not 
merely represent his greater status through his action. He also makes himself more 
powerful by coercing those beneath him. Thus, the metaphysical interpretation claims 
that wrongs reshape our moral world as opposed to merely representing victims and 
wrongdoers inaccurately.41 This is not to deny, of course, the conventional nature of the 
specific means used in many cases of moral injury. However, wrongful acts often 
“involve conventions so deep that they are constitutive of human society, and may be 
regarded as natural in that sense.”42 Similarly, the ways humans respond to wrongs are 
conventional. Responding to a rapist by merely alerting the community that his evidence 
of superiority is incorrect (Gert, et al.’s suggestion) is to disregard the fact that life is 
governed by conventions which carry normative force. In the case of rape, our 
                                                 
39 Farnham, “A Hegelian Theory of Retribution”, 4. He later switches to calling the metaphysical 
component “Hegelian.”  
40 Ibid., 7.  
41 On this point Farnham bends Hampton’s position in a Hegelian direction. Recall, Hampton’s 
Kantianism commits her to the view that all persons have equal worth no matter how they are mistreated. 
Of course, then it is unclear why punishment restores right. Farnham resolves this problem by invoking 
Hegel’s idea “of the need to give our abstract ideas (such as autonomy or right) concrete expression 
through the use of social conventions...We need to do this because we are not primarily debaters about 
what is true, we are primarily embodied agents.” See Farnham, “A Hegelian Theory of Retribution,” 8.  
42 Farnham, “A Hegelian Theory of Retribution”, 9.  
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convention of disapproval is not captured via the static message of formal memoranda. 
Words alone cannot remake the moral world. Therefore, responding to a rapist in this 
merely communicative way is, according to our deep conventions, wrong. Punishment is 
meant to reshape the moral world once again in order to establish equality. “When a 
person has been wronged by another, the most relevant feature of the person wronged is 
the relation that obtains between her and her wrongdoer.”43 Proportional retribution 
repairs this relation. When the state, acting on the victim’s behalf, lowers the wrongdoer 
before the victim, “the wrongdoer has something done to him.” 44 Moral reality is 
restored because the victim’s agency (or value) is realized. 
 Farnham’s defense then supposedly saves Hampton’s theory from Dolinko’s and 
Gert, et al.’s objections. By focusing on the metaphysical view, Farnham addresses four 
points: (1) The metaphysical view escapes Dolinko’s contention regarding free speech. 
Punishment does not have to respond to all false moral claims, only those which 
substantively reshape our moral world. Because publishing false moral views does not 
directly reshape our moral world, punishment is not required to correct these views. 45 
(2) Punishment’s conventional nature quells Gert, et al.’s worry that punishment 
supports immoral evidence through equating power with moral value. We simply do not 
understand punishment as upholding this equation.46 Instead, we conventionally 
                                                 
43 “A Hegelian Theory of Retribution”, 13. 
44 Ibid., 12.  
45 Of course, false moral claims can and often do reshape our moral world in significant ways, like when 
racist literature encourages racist attacks or instills general racist attitudes, however, I think Farnham 
would maintain that such claims are fundamentally representations and therefore less morally worrisome 
than the attacks and attitudes they promote.  
46 Gert, et al. interpret Hampton according to the Gricean theory of natural meaning. Gert. et al., “Hampton 
on the Expressive Power of Punishment,” 86.  
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understand punishment as restoring the moral world. Because this convention is so deep, 
it seems impossible to give up on pain of dramatically changing our moral landscape. (3) 
Retributive punishment is uniquely suited to restore moral equality because only it 
actually lowers the wrongdoer. By contrast, mere announcements cannot address the real 
inequality between victim and wrongdoer and are thus incapable of restoring moral 
equality. (4) Retribution, Farnham concludes, is morally justified because its egalitarian 
motivations and accomplishments are moral.  
 
D. Objections to Hampton 
 As we saw above, Farnham’s metaphysical interpretation presumes punishment 
does major re-shaping work. Similarly, Gert et al.’s epistemological interpretation 
presumes punishment offers counter-evidence (although they think such evidence is 
spurious). In the following analysis, I examine these functions. In doing so, I employ 
Joel Feinberg’s distinction between two general conceptions of justice, comparative and 
noncomparative. Employing this schema is fruitful because it allows us to zero in on 
conceptual assumptions implicit in Hampton’s theory. In analyzing these assumptions, I 
argue Hampton conflates comparative and noncomparative principles, thus ultimately 
making her retributivism unsatisfactory. I also argue that insofar as the debate between 
the critics and Farnham ignores this schema, Farnham’s rebuttal falls short of 
exonerating Hampton’s faults.  
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Comparative justice, Feinberg notes, involves “equality in the treatment accorded 
all the members of a class.”47 Conversely, comparative injustice consists in departing 
“from the requisite form of equal treatment without good reason.”48 Prizes exemplify 
events defined by their use of comparative principles because the relevant form of equal 
treatment consists in giving each contestant their fair hearing and judging each according 
to the same rules of the competition. The aim of this fair hearing and the idea of the 
contest generally speaking, however, is the purpose of selecting the best X or “the exact 
ranking of contestants against one another.”49 Thus, when dealing with prizes, for 
instance, pie-baking contests, it is impossible to determine who deserves the blue ribbon 
without tasting the pies of the other bakers.50 Indeed all forms of comparative justice 
involve this principle of consulting the claims or merits of others.  
Noncomparative justice, by contrast, does not include the principle of 
consultation.51 For instance, in the case of grades, a person’s “rights-or-deserts alone 
determine what is due him.”52 When doing noncomparative justice to large groups of 
people, “we do not compare them with each other, but rather we compare each in turn 
                                                 
47 Joel Feinberg. “Noncomparative Justice,” 299.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid., 205. Feinberg goes on to discuss how contests can include noncomparative elements, however, he 
represents contests like the pie-baking variety as the iconic comparative judgment. 
51 Another relevant noncomparative paradigm Feinberg notes is retributive punishment. However, 
Feinberg’s use of the term retributive punishment bears no mention of proportionate punishment. I 
presume he uses the term to designate the belief that wrongdoers’ desert is a sufficient condition for just 
punishment. See page 301.  
52 Feinberg, “Noncomparative Justice,” 300. Later, on page 306, Feinberg also says grades can include 
comparative principles, for instance, when grading on a curve. Nevertheless Feinberg maintains that 
grades are a classic example of noncomparative judgments.  
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with an objective standard and judge each (as we say)‘on his merits.’”53 Thus, 
noncomparative justice supplies tools to criticize cases which comparative justice cannot 
provide; e.g., noncomparative justice finds cases where all persons are treated poorly as 
nevertheless morally unacceptable.  
Clearly, however, our world is not so clear-cut as to have two wholly non-
overlapping types of justice. The case of exploitation makes this evident. Let’s say we 
happen to come across an exploited person, for example, a slave. Here is someone whose 
actions have not merited his demeaning treatment (as in fact none of his actions could). 
Also, assuming a Kantian view of personhood, his rights are clearly violated. In 
justifying our judgment that he is exploited, we cite premises that concern only this 
particular slave and an objective moral standard denied him. Thus, we employ 
noncomparative principles. However, our moral outrage at the slave’s treatment 
probably exceeds the case thus described. This is because the target of our moral outrage 
includes the slave’s relationship to his master and is directed at his master. Here we are 
angry because “a comparison is made between the resultant condition of the exploiter 
and that of his victim” and this comparison is surely unjust.54 Thus, comparative and 
noncomparative principles can operate in tandem. If we are as careful in analyzing other 
cases as we have been in this, we can parse apart the relevant moral principles in an 
effort to better determine how to express our moral responses.  
 This is exactly what Hampton does not do. To see how we must recall what 
Hampton claims moral injurers say. (1) They implicitly claim their victims are not so 
                                                 
53 Joel Feinberg. “Noncomparative Justice,” 300.  
54 Ibid, 301.  
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valuable that their value precludes such treatment and (2) they implicitly say they are 
worth more than their victims. With our Feinbergian schema in hand, we now see that 
(1) is judgment of noncomparatively injustice because it makes no reference to persons 
besides the victim while (2) is a judgment of comparative injustice because it references 
a relationship between two persons. Recall also that for Hampton, punishment is the 
proper response to moral injury because it reasserts the victim’s worth and denies the 
wrongdoer’s false claim. Indeed, punishment is justified insofar as it is uniquely suited 
to respond in these ways. However, these ways of responding – reasserting a positive 
value and denying comparative disvalue– are two very different things. Reassertion 
responds to noncomparative wrongs, while denial responds to comparative wrongs. So 
what do we make of Hampton’s claim that punishment is the wrongdoer’s defeat at the 
hands of the victim? That is, it seems clear that the idea of punishment as defeat 
responds to comparative wrongs because it explicitly refers to the victim and wrongdoer. 
It is less patent, however, whether defeat responds to noncomparative wrongs (through 
reassertion), and, if it does, we must assess if defeat guarantees reassertion. Recall, it is 
necessary for defeat to guarantee reasserting noncomparative wrongs because reassertion 
is part of Hampton’s own criteria for punishment’s justification. Hence, Hampton needs 
an argument explaining why retributive punishment, which apparently answers 
comparative wrongs, also answers noncomparative wrongs.  
If defeat counters noncomparative wrongs it seems to do so only by default. That 
is, it is conceptually plausible that defeat broadcasts the victim’s value insofar as she is 
“raised,” however, its primary purpose is responding to comparative wrongs. Answering 
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noncomparative wrongs via reassertion is its secondary purpose because reassertion is 
distinct from defeat. So defeat appears justified because it can, as it were, kill two birds 
with one stone: first through responding to comparative wrongs, and second through 
responding to noncomparative wrongs. However, this secondary function that Hampton 
ascribes to defeat – its ability to counter noncomparative wrongs - disrupts the coherence 
in Hampton’s retributivism. To illustrate, consider the following example.55 Two 
inexperienced tennis players, Ann and Bea, play each other in a match and Ann wins. 
What has Ann accomplished? Certainly Ann has satisfied certain criteria (namely, 
winning) indicating her status as a comparatively better player. However, Ann has 
probably accomplished little more than this because Ann is, after all, an inexperienced 
player. Ann’s victory does not reveal her to be a good player. Therefore, comparatively 
Ann seems better and yet noncomparatively she still seems bad. Hampton’s theory of 
retribution works the same way. Proportionate punishment comparatively defeats the 
wrongdoer and avows the victim’ worth, relative to the offender, however, it is uncertain 
if it addresses the noncomparative value of victims. Of course, a victim’s worth could be 
noncomparatively reasserted via punishment if, for instance, it reminds her and others 
that she possesses inalienable dignity. But what reason is there to think punishment 
invariably reminds in this way? It appears highly unlikely that punishment reveals 
victims’ inalienable worth simply because wrongs seem to provide such strong evidence 
that victims lack worth, both to victims themselves and to their communities. Because of 
this lack of guarantee, the coherence of Hampton’s view is strained. Hampton’s theory 
                                                 
55 Linda Radzik pointed out this useful example to me.  
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of punishment wants to assert the victim’s value, however, she provides no argument for 
how punishment is linked to this noncomparative assertion and in light of the facts just 
discussed, it appears doubtful such an argument could be given.  
Hampton has two options. She can (1) admit her retributivism is justified on only 
comparative principles, which reverse or deny the wrongdoer’s proportionately higher 
status and his victim’s proportionately lower status. This move is problematic, though, 
because the comparative principles animating punishment are not solely victim-focused. 
As we have seen, reasserting is at best proportionate punishment’s secondary function. 
Hence, comparative principles seem incapable of accounting for Hampton’s retributive 
motivation, namely, victim reassertion, which is noncomparative. Perhaps Hampton 
might then (2) amend her retributivism to include only noncomparative principles. 
Hence, Hampton’s theory would fall back on the traditional retributive desert thesis, 
which claims accurate punitive judgments are based solely off the wrongdoer’s 
noncomparative desert. It is unclear though how retribution of this sort could reassert the 
victim’s worth because the retributive desert thesis does not reference victims. Hampton 
then cannot legitimately aver that punishment is sufficient to justify punishment’s unique 
reassertion function. Therefore, we can say relevant non-punitive mediums might 
perform the reassertion function better than punishment. Perhaps giving victims a high-
paying job or a vacation might better do the trick. In any case, nothing about 
noncomparative-based punishment per se would justify why it alone reasserts victims’ 
value.  
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 In my criticism thus far I have used the language of “reassertion” and “denial,” 
hardly the metaphysically robust terms employed in Farnham’s metaphysical 
interpretation. To avoid begging the question against Farnham by using the critics’ 
epistemological interpretation, I’ll use the metaphysical interpretation. Recall that on 
Farnham’s view punishment not only corrects false evidence, but also concretely 
reestablishes moral equality. By being lowered at the hands of the victim, “the 
wrongdoer has something done to him.” 56 And indeed, the wrongdoer has something 
done to him because the most relevant feature “of the person wronged is the relation that 
obtains between her and her wrongdoer,” which punishment concretely reverses. 57  
It is worth pointing out that Farnham’s metaphysical interpretation assumes 
comparative premises: the victim is low while the wrongdoer is high in terms of their 
abilities to realize their value in the world. These premises require comparative 
responses making it the case that both parties realize their value equally so that moral 
reality is restored. Does this have any effect on my argument’s conclusion reached 
above?  
Unfortunately, Farnham’s inclusion of metaphysical language helps his argument 
little because although it is plausible that punishment changes the comparative relation 
(by bringing the wrongdoer low), there is no reason to think punishment establishes the 
dignity of either party. That is, reversing the comparative inequality between the two 
parties could restore the victim, however, it by no means guarantees it because the 
metaphysical principles underlying punishment and those underlying making the victim 
                                                 
56 Farnham, “A Hegelian Theory of Retribution,” 12.  
57 Ibid., 13. 
 
  24
a robust agent are simply not equivalent. To illustrate, consider the state employing a 
convention that claims punishment honors the victim of, let us say, a violent crime. What 
reason is there to think the victim is now no longer living in fear, no longer restricting 
her actions from fear? Is there any reason to think the victim is now living a free life? 
Similarly, consider the state’s convention of incarcerating the criminal. How is he better 
off? How does living a severely restricted life enable him to become an equally valuable 
(as opposed to a superior) person? Conflating the two principles, as Farnham does, just 
begs the question. If restoring the victim is premised on comparative principles (which it 
is not), and proportionate punishment is the proper response to such principles, then 
restoring the victim means proportionately punishing. This is conceptually incorrect. The 
concept of restoring the victim is not wedded to proportionate punishment because it 
does not hinge on comparing the victim and wrongdoer. Rather, restoring the victim 
presupposes the judgment that she has been treated in a manner ill suited to her 
noncomparative value. It is a big jump indeed to presume this judgment is analytically 
tied to punishment. As we have seen, punishment, at best, restores the victim by default. 
Metaphysics, then, does not help Farnham’s defense.  
Perhaps though Farnham is on to something. Maybe Hampton’s theory does 
contain a metaphysics. If there is such a metaphysics, however, it must surely be distinct 
from the comparative principles which underlie the critics’ and Farnham’s 
interpretations. The legitimacy of such comparative principles pivots on the assumption 
that reasonable persons will find proportionate punishment the best means of restoration 
and reversal. However, this is clearly a large and controversial assumption. Although 
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some persons may think wrongdoers should suffer for serious wrongs through severe 
punishment, certainly not all people do. By contrast, noncomparative judgments are less 
controversial. They take the form: Someone has been mistreated and we must see to 
treating her correctly (typically according to her inherent worth). Notice, this judgment 
is distinct from mandating proportionate punishment because it is victim-focused and 
does not reference the wrongdoer. The principles animating this noncomparative 
judgment run deeper than the comparative judgment. We care about people’s rights, 
abilities, and well-being and not just how their rights, abilities, and well-being compare 
with those of other people. However, caring in the noncomparative way is also 
constitutive of moral life and certainly of the conception of human dignity Hampton 
endorses. By contrast, the comparative principles motivating proportionate punishment 
seem less constitutive.  
 
E. Concluding Remarks 
Despite the problems Hampton’s retributivism encounters, she succeeds in a way 
traditional retributivists have not by linking proportionate punishment to our familiar 
intuitions about wrongs. This is a tactic ignored by traditional retributivists who usually 
attempt to justify punishment via the much-disputed non-comparative desert thesis. 
Instead, Hampton begins with the less contentious thesis that wrongs create (claim) 
comparative inequality. According to Hampton, punishment is justified because it re-
establishes (reasserts) equality. Unfortunately, Hampton also believes but cannot explain 
that punishment restores (reasserts) victims’ noncomparative worth. In the end, and 
 
  26
irrespective of which interpretation - epistemological or metaphysical - one applies, 
Hampton’s employment of comparative principles fails to link retribution with its 
purported victim-focused motivation and end. It is sheer conjecture that punishment, 
which levels the playing field between victim and wrongdoer, also speaks to each party’s 
noncomparative value.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
HEGEL’S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT: THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS WHICH 
 
LEGITIMIZE NEGATIVE RETRIBUTIVISM 
 
A. Introduction 
 
In the last chapter we saw that Hampton implicitly relies on two notions of justice, 
comparative and noncomparative. I did not, however, explicitly mention two other 
implicit features of Hampton’s theory: (1) her idea of desert is comparative in that how 
much punishment a criminal deserves is established by how “low” he brings his victim 
relative to his “raised” status. This comparative idea of desert is in stark contrast to the 
traditional view that regards punitive desert as a noncomparative concept. Yet despite 
Hampton’s unique understanding of desert, she shares with the traditional view the idea 
(2) that justice consists in treating persons in accordance with their deserts.58 In other 
words, according to the traditional view, desert is “prejusticial”; that is, desert is 
conceptually prior or exterior to justice.59 Hampton’s adherence to the prejusticial view 
is evinced when she justifies punishment as the practice that adequately responds to 
punitive desert claims.  
Construed as a normative principle, the traditional definition of justice yields at 
least two distinct claims. Interpreted strictly, we have an obligation to punish. This view 
is positive retributivism, the theory that claims justice requires (1) treating criminals’ in 
                                                 
58 The traditional view of justice is discussed in Feinberg, “Noncomparative Justice,” The Philosophical 
Review 83 (1974): 297-338, at 298. Feinberg says that punitive desert can be understood either 
comparatively or noncomparatively at 310-311.   
59 “Presjusticial” is Samuel Scheffler’s term. See, “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” in S. 
Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003) 69-92. It should also be noted that 
Hampton’s use of comparative justice is also prejusticial.  
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accordance with their just deserts, which in turn demands (2) proportionately punishing 
criminals. When criminals are not treated in accordance with their deserts and 
proportionately punished, it is unjust. Therefore, insofar as we are morally required to be 
just, we are also required to punish criminals. If, on the other hand, we interpret the 
traditional definition less strictly, then our obligation consists in basing punishment’s 
permissibility on desert claims. This view is negative retributivism: punishment is just 
only when inflicted on the deserving. This is not to say, however, that justice demands 
punishment (as the positive retributivist contends); other factors may outweigh our 
reasons to punish (e.g., costs or inability to deter future wrongdoers). Nevertheless, so 
long as those punished do deserve it, punishment is, at least minimally, just, and 
punishment in excess of desert is deemed unjust.60 Hence, negative retributivism merely 
finds punishment permissible (insofar as it is deserved), not required. Again, though, 
what unites both forms of retributivism is their employment of prejusticial desert, which 
is understood as a legitimate moral principle prior to justice.  
This chapter questions whether punishment’s expressive function is inherently 
tied to prejusticial desert. In pursing this question, I analyze Hegel’s theory of 
punishment. Like Hampton, Hegel articulates the expressive function of punishment, 
employs a comparative notion of desert, and is usually read as employing the traditional 
prejusticial desert view. Specifically, Hegel is often read as a positive retributivist. 
Recently, however, Wolfgang Schild has argued against the positive retributivist 
                                                 
60 Both types of retributivism actually share the notion of desert as an upper limit.  
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interpretation; instead, Schild reads Hegel as a negative retributivist.61 I contend that 
Schild’s reading is problematic insofar as it yields a contradiction: Hegel appears to 
uphold both consequentialism and retributivism. Without departing from endorsing the 
negative retributivist line, I argue that avoiding this contradiction requires forgoing the 
traditional prejusticial definition of desert. Thus, I maintain that Hegel is a nontraditional 
negative retributivist. For Hegel, desert becomes a legitimate moral notion only after just 
social institutions are erected, but Hegel maintains his status as a negative retributivist 
insofar as punishment is deemed permissible via desert claims.  
My argument focuses on Hegel’s theory of freedom, something Schild ignores. 
Since Hegel never explicitly states my argument, and my argument presupposes moral 
features found throughout The Philosophy of Right, I examine how The Philosophy of 
Right works as whole. So rather than limit my focus to Hegel’s overt discussions of 
punishment in the “Abstract Right” and “Ethical Life” sections, I analyze the kinds of 
freedom appropriate to these two sections.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I explain why commentators have 
traditionally regarded Hegel as a positive retributivist. These commentators base their 
reading on the “Abstract Right” section where Hegel indeed puts forth a positive 
retributive theory. Next, I look at Schild’s argument that Hegel’s emphasis on crime’s 
                                                 
61 Wolfgang Schild, “The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel’s Concept of Punishment,” in Hegel on 
Ethics and Politics. Ed. Robert B. Pippin and Otfried Hoffe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). I actually impute the “positive” and “negative” terminology to Schild. Although Schild refrains 
from this language, it is clear that he thinks Hegel is a negative retributivist. For the only other paper I’m 
aware of that argues Hegel is a negative retributivist (although it again does not use that term) see, Thom 
Brooks, “Is Hegel a Retributivist?” The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain (2004): 113-126. I 
do not discuss Brooks’s paper here because Schild covers most of Brook’s points and his paper is better 
known.  
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effects makes him a negative retributivist. Finally, and against Schild, I argue that 
Hegel’s endorsement of negative retributivism is premised upon rejecting prejusticial 
desert (not crime’s effects), a claim I establish through examining the structure of The 
Philosophy of Right and Hegelian freedom. 
 
 
B. Hegel’s Positive Retributivism  
  
Understanding Hegel’s punitive theory as a retributive theory first requires glossing what 
he means by the term ‘right’ (Recht). In §1 Hegel states, “The subject-matter of the 
philosophical science of right is the Idea of right – the concept of right and its 
actualization.” Hegel tells us the concept of right is freedom and right’s actualization is 
“any existence [Dasein] in general which is the existence of the free will” (§29).62 When 
Hegel refers to right, he usually means right in this second sense - the actual existence of 
freedom. “Existence” for Hegel, Allen Wood notes, designates “something objective, 
something ‘immediately external’ to the will.”63 Therefore right refers to an external 
thing, but not a mere object; it designates a thing (our thing) through which our free will 
is free (or “with itself”). Notice, then, Hegel’s use of the term right (Recht) is quite 
different from the way we (as in we English-speaking philosophers and people 
generally) typically use the term. As Wood states, “Normally, we do not refer to a thing 
we own as a right, but say instead that we have a right to it, meaning at least that we do 
                                                 
62 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, translated by H.B. Nisbet and edited by Allen Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). It should be noted that when I quote the section number 
in the body of the paper I will, in standard fashion, also include an “A” or “R” after the section number if I 
am quoting an addition or a remark.  
63 Allen Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.), at 72.Wood 
references §26 here.  
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nothing contrary to obligation in using it as we see fit, and perhaps also that we have 
valid claims against others with regard to its use.”64 By contrast, Hegel’s use of right 
signifies a more comprehensive notion of freedom; it includes (as we shall see) not just 
what we mean by formal or legal rights, but also the subjective and objective conditions 
necessary for freedom. For now though, we let the term designate a freedom-imbued 
object. 
 Hegel’s turn to crime and punishment pivots on his idea of right. Crime, he says, 
is the intentional violation of another’s right (§95). Given our above definition of right, 
we see that insofar as crime explicitly coerces a person’s external embodiment of 
freedom, his property which includes his body and well-being, it also implicitly denies 
his concept as a free being, someone with a “capacity for rights” (ibid). That is, because 
man expresses his freedom through infusing his will in objects (property), actions that 
intentionally deny a person his legitimate use of property in effect deny his freedom. 
Nevertheless, Hegel labels the criminal will “null” because its intention to deny (the 
concept of) freedom inevitably fails because freedom “which has no external 
existence… is to that extent invulnerable” (§§97-99). Instead, criminal actions (the 
criminal will’s external embodiment) merely harm freedom’s external embodiment, 
property.  
Punishment, Hegel says, “cancels” the infringement. Here, one might be tempted 
to think that Hegel bizarrely treats punishment as an instrument that erases crime. Yet 
how can punishment erase or undo something that has already happened? But, Hegel 
                                                 
64 Wood, 72.  
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does not equate “cancel” with “erase.” Instead, we can infer from our earlier discussion 
of right that punishment cancels in the sense of buttressing the forms (embodiments) of 
freedom which crime denies. So, for instance, through canceling the robber’s chance to 
hold his stolen goods (by taking away such goods and by incarcerating him for a 
specified time), punishment upholds the right to property. This kind of response is 
required because, as Hegel reminds us, “actual right” or freedom is a “mediated 
existence”; it requires external form in order to fully exist (§97). As strange as Hegel’s 
language of “mediated existence” is, his position is clearly in line with our intuitions 
regarding freedom. That is, we usually think it is not enough to say we have freedom, we 
must also enforce the ways we express our freedom, the ways we give freedom actual 
existence. Hegel’s notion of punishment jibes with this intuition. It is the instrument that 
enforces the norm banning coercion.  
Still, we are far from retributivism proper. After all, Hegel has only told us 
punishment reaffirms the appropriate media freedom requires. He has yet to mention the 
following two traditional retributivist claims: (1) the desert thesis and (2) the 
proportionality thesis.  
In §100 we find Hegel’s desert thesis:  
The injury [Verletzung] which is inflicted on the criminal is not only just in 
itself…it is also a right for the criminal himself, that is, a right posited in his 
existent will, in his action. For it is implicit in his action, as that of a rational 
being, that it is universal in character, and that, by performing it, he has set up a 
law which he has recognized for himself in his action, and under which he may 
therefore be subsumed as under his right.  
 
Hegel goes on to say: “In so far as the punishment which this entails is seen as 
embodying the criminal’s own right, the criminal is honoured as a rational being” 
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(§100R). Hegel claims the criminal is dishonored if he is “punished with a view to 
deterring or reforming him” since these aims are wholly exterior to his willed-action. 
That is, deterrence and reform derive their justification through appealing to the need to 
better control society. Individuals are thus viewed secondary to society and then only as 
wholly determined beings to be corrected through coercive professional management. 
Thus, deterrence and rehabilitation dishonor the criminal because they ignore the 
criminal’s will itself (his choice to commit the crime and its punitive consequences)  
(ibid).  
Hegel’s proportionality thesis is in §101: 
 
The cancellation [Aufheben] of crime is retribution in so far as the latter, by its 
concept, is an infringement of an infringement…But this identity [of crime and 
retribution], which is based on the concept, is not an equality in the specific 
character of the infringement, but in its character in itself – i.e., in terms of its 
value.  
 
Proportionality according to “value” demands that we draw what Hegel labels 
“qualitative” distinctions between types of crimes (like robbery and theft), which we 
then use as our reference in deciding the type or length of punishment (quantitative 
distinctions) (§101). As long as we are consistent in assigning more serious punishments 
(like longer sentences) to more serious wrongs (like robbery), then we are following the 
proportionality injunction. Notice that Hegel’s retributivism does not commit him to 
upholding lex talionis as his emphasis on the term “value” signifies. Hegel explicitly 
dismisses lex talionis for both practical and moral reasons. His practical argument takes 
the following form: “It is very easy to portray the retributive aspect of punishment as an 
absurdity (theft as retribution for theft, robbery for robbery, an eye for an eye, and a 
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tooth for a tooth, so that one can imagine the miscreant as one-eyed or toothless)” 
(§101R). His moral argument is not that lex talionis is inherently prone to immoral 
excess (e.g, rape for rape, etc.) and therefore seems to violate our moral intuitions, but 
that it denies our ability to think abstractly, that is, to think like a person. Otherwise put, 
lex talionis denies our status as free beings by requiring submission to our immediate 
(i.e., emotional or “personal”) selves (§101A). By contrast, conceiving of punishment in 
terms of value “raises our representation [Vorstellung] of a thing above its immediate 
character to the universal” (ibid). Raising thought out of our immediacy properly 
constitutes what it means to think like a person.  
 Thus, given that Hegel’s punitive theory explicitly contains desert and 
proportionality theses, it is not surprising Hegel is read as a positive retributivist. Indeed, 
if the” Abstract Right” section contained Hegel’s whole punitive theory, it would be 
accurate to consider Hegel a positive retributivist.  
 
C. Schild’s Negative Retributivist Interpretation 
Schild notes that Hegel’s punitive theory extends beyond his discussion in “Abstract 
Right” into “Civil Society,” a subsection of “Ethical Life.”65 Indeed, it is fitting that 
Hegel’s theory of punishment is thoroughly developed in “Civil Society” because only 
civil society has courts and juridical proceedings.66 Therefore, punishment in “Abstract 
                                                 
65 Schild, 158.  
66 It may appear surprising that Hegel includes courts in his depiction of civil society and not in “The 
State.” Hegel has in mind that because civil society is the realm of the marketplace, members relate to 
each other too contingently (i.e., based on particular self-interest and not as universal beings. See §§182-
187, 208.). Thus, civil society is not the highest form of freedom in ethical life, but rather the state is. 
Nevertheless because most crimes are market related (e.g., theft) or aimed directly at particular members, 
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Right” is impoverished because “the annulling of crime in this [abstract] sphere where 
right is immediate is principally revenge” (§102).67 But what about the absence of courts 
makes punishment a form of vengeance? Hegel states that punishment is vengeance 
when it (1) wholly depends (is “contingent”) on the whim of an individual to inflict it 
and (2) “appears as only particular,” that is, biased, to the offending party himself (ibid). 
Because of this bias, punishment appears to the offending party as a new crime, a wholly 
unjustified action, which calls forth its own punitive response. Consequently, 
punishment is unstable because it induces an “infinite progression” of revenge (ibid). 
 In civil society crime is no longer solely a particular affair because it references 
legal concepts like property. Legal concepts are distinct from particular concepts 
because they explicitly invoke all legal subjects through universally enforcing a set of 
applied rights and duties. Thus, property is a legal concept when some governing body 
(e.g., the state) universally upholds its validity and safeguards it against infractions (e.g., 
theft). Conversely, infractions of legal norms are universal as well. That is, legal 
infractions are salient because they implicitly deny the foundation of civil society itself: 
adherence to legal custom. Thus, crime is important not just to the immediately relevant 
parties (e.g., victim and wrongdoer) but to all legal subjects. Indeed, this emphasis on the 
external nature of crime, in contrast to the criminal’s personal reasons for acting 
perniciously (crime’s subjective side), undergirds Hegel’s (as well as our own) notion of 
                                                                                                                                                
courts are in civil society because they respond to particular crimes.  In fact, Hegel contradicts himself on 
this point by including the legislative and executive branches in the state. In this sense, civil society is “in” 
the state. See §§287, 298.  
67 Given Hegel’s link between punishment and revenge in “Abstract Right,” it is somewhat curious how 
Hegel’s comments on revenge ever lent support to an “Abstract Right” retributivist interpretation, which 
construes punishment as just. Hegel explicitly states in §220 that the private nature of revenge makes it 
unjust.  
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“legal responsibility.”68 This is not to say juridical proceedings are incapable of taking 
into consideration criminals’ reasons for acting wrongly, but it does mean courts are 
principally unconcerned with these considerations.69  
 For Hegel, crime’s (external) significance increases by the magnitude of danger 
it poses to society. Crime’s magnitude of danger encompasses two forms:  (1) through 
actually spreading crimes, for example, when an arsonist means to burn only one 
building, yet ends up burning a whole city block; and (2) through encouraging other 
crimes. Criminals encourage criminal activity because they are rational and rational 
agents will universal maxims. “Anyone who performs acts at all, does something, as a 
thinking human being, which is to count as valid in general.”70 In other words, 
irrespective of what criminals intend (e.g., a particular maxim) they cannot help but 
engage in an already constituted field of social meaning, which treats certain actions 
(namely, criminal actions) as wrong. “From this perspective, the danger in question is a 
determination that belongs to one’s act as such.”71
 Yet, just because crime is inherently dangerous, that does not mean crime is 
inherently damaging. “If society is secure, and a peaceful condition prevails, crimes are 
thereby demoted to cases of individual [in contrast to universal] acts. If the laws are 
upheld, then crime has not really damaged society as such.”72 Hence, the stability of law 
                                                 
68 Schild, 161. Reference to Hegel’s discussion of culpability in §132.  
69 That is, presuming the criminal is rational and either knew or could have known the legal prohibition. 
Hegel, of course, thinks subjective considerations are necessarily pertinent regarding children and severely 
mentally ill persons who break the law because they, strictly speaking, are irresponsible for their actions. 
See §120.  
70 Schild, 160. Quote from Hegel: VPR4, 28off. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Schild, 160. Quote from Hegel: VPR4, 550.  
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helps deny the influence of crime’s message and prevent the criminal’s act from 
encouraging others because the law (right) is clearly seen as distinct from crime. “Then I 
do not infer from the existence of crime that it is supposed to embody the existence of 
my evil will, but it becomes rather a quite particular affair, and the side through which 
the crime might become more dangerous also equally well can be disregarded under the 
law-governed conditions of civil society.”73  
 Hegel’s discussion of danger explicitly marks a practical turn away from 
“Abstract Right’s” theory of punishment. Danger references legal concepts and therefore 
a universal state of affairs the meaning of which exceeds individual crimes’ values. This 
is why danger is conceptually unavailable in “Abstract Right”; its reference to universal 
norms (laws) contrasts with “Abstract Right’s” immediacy where individual persons 
punish crime in an unspecified and contingent way (revenge). 74 When Hegel applies the 
idea of danger to punishment he says, “The fact that an injury to one member of society 
is an injury to all others does not alter the conception of wrongdoing, but it does alter it 
in respect of its outward existence” (§218R). In other words, the concept of wrongdoing 
remains constant: wrongdoing is the intentional violation of another’s right. However, in 
civil society, wrongdoing takes on an added meaning: wrongs reference all members of 
civil society. This added reference is associated with the “actual” wrongdoing that 
potentially endangers or harms all societal members through the message it sends and 
the potential influence of that message when it undermines legal stability. Therefore, 
Hegel claims, if “society has become strong and sure of itself” it can diminish “the 
                                                 
73 Ibid. Quote from Hegel: VPR4, 551.  
74 Schild, 167.  
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external importance of the injury” and mitigate its punishment (§218). This emphasis on 
danger, according to Schild, illustrates that in civil society Hegel’s punitive theory is not 
positively retributivist. Of course, courts can always decide to impose desert-based 
punishment because such punishment is always permissible; it “respects” the 
wrongdoer’s agency. However, under certain conditions (i.e., living in civil society), 
treating criminals in accordance with their just deserts is not required. Courts retain the 
right to bypass desert-based punishment when mitigating sentences. 
Schild neglects, however, to discuss the rest of §218. There Hegel says that, 
understood in the context of danger, crime’s “quality of magnitude varies, however, 
according to the condition of civil society, and this is the justification [what makes it 
permissible] both for attaching the death penalty to a theft of a few pence or of a turnip, 
and for imposing lenient punishment for a theft of a hundred and more times these 
amounts.” Here it is plain that Hegel does not limit punishment according to the 
prejusticial desert thesis in direct violation of the retributivist core criteria that makes 
desert the upper limit. It seems, then, that Hegel, at least according to the retributivist, 
takes “excessive” punishment to be justifiable. And if excessive punishment is 
justifiable, something besides desert does the primary justificatory work. Thus, Hegel is 
not open to Schild’s negative retributivist interpretation because, at least in “Ethical 
Life,” Hegel justifies punishment along consequentialist lines, which appear to permit 
excessive punishment.  
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D. The Social Conditions Which Legitimize Negative Retributivism 
 
At this point, one might think Hegel is simply inconsistent; he presents us with two 
wholly distinct theories, retributivism and consequentialism. I think attributing 
inconsistency to Hegel rests on misinterpreting how The Philosophy of Right works as 
whole. In order to see how Hegel is consistent, we need to understand how his punitive 
theory fits into The Philosophy of Right. As we shall see, the entire purpose of The 
Philosophy of Right is to outline the highest and most substantial form of freedom 
appropriate to man, the freedom of ethical life, or, as I will also sometimes call it here, 
social freedom.75 I explain this relation in two major steps. First, I illustrate how 
“Abstract Right’s” notion of desert is prejusticial, and, that when personality (linked as it 
is to desert) is construed as freedom, it ultimately leads to irrationality. Then, I argue that 
“Ethical Life’s” notion of social freedom (which is conditioned by just social 
institutions) transforms “Abstract Right’s” notion of desert into a legitimate moral 
concept. Thus, Hegel’s emphasis on social freedom saves desert as a moral notion, 
however, he rejects it understood as prejusticial concept. 
Abstract Right and Personal Desert 
 
Recall that when Hegel uses the term “right” he means some kind of actual existence of 
the free will (§1). Indeed, Hegel says, The Philosophy of Right is the examination of the 
different ways and stages through which the will becomes free (§33).76 Hence, when 
                                                 
75 In employing the term “social freedom” to designate Hegel’s most substantial form of freedom, I follow 
Frederick Neuhouser. See his book Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000).  
76 The stages of freedom which The Philosophy of Right outlines do not reflect the chronological order 
whereby freedom is realized in the real world. In this sense, the ordering of the book is itself an exercise in 
abstract reasoning. See §32A Knox. Here and elsewhere throughout the paper I reference T.M. Knox’s 
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Hegel begins The Philosophy of Right, and labels the first major section “Abstract 
Right,” we know this term designates some instance or kind of freedom. What kind of 
freedom then is abstract freedom?77  
In explaining “Abstract Right’s” freedom, it helps to examine one of its core 
features, personhood. Hegel tells us personhood is marked by “immediacy” and “formal 
universality” (§§34,35). By this, Hegel defines persons by their capacity to abstract their 
wills from all objects or content. Insofar as all individuals confront this capacity 
immediately, that is, on reflection abstracted (or non-mediated) from external objects 
(including human beings), personhood is universal. Abstract reasoning is crucial to 
freedom because through reflecting we remove ourselves from our drives, specific 
situations, and all other “particularities,” and thus acknowledge our fundamental nature 
as self-determining beings (§7). Indeed, the concept of personhood (abstract self-
determination) grounds all of the institutions Hegel addresses in “Abstract Right”: 
contract, property, and punishment. Hegel claims personhood is plagued, however, by 
“arbitrariness” and “contingency” (§§15,16). In other words, since the person’s free 
identity determines itself based off its capacity to abstract from all content, the “I is 
totally empty” (§4A). Thus, the person is not bound to identify with any particular action 
and in fact chooses to act based on whim, that is, off no principled basis (§§16,17).  
                                                                                                                                                
translation instead of Nisbet’s. See, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, translated by T.M. Knox (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1967). However, it is unfair to say the ordering of the book is totally an exercise 
in abstract reasoning because Hegel makes clear that the real social conditions which underlay social 
freedom (the highest freedom) are presupposed in being able to designate the lower stages as “one-sided.” 
See 57A. 
77 For the remainder of the paper I will sometimes write abstract right in lowercase to designate abstract 
freedom. I will capitalize it when referring to the section “Abstract Right” proper. Similarly, I will 
lowercase ethical life when designating social membership.  
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Because we know that personhood is central to each feature of “Abstract Right,” 
we also know it must apply to Hegel’s retributive discussion of punishment, located, as 
it is, in “Abstract Right.” This fact alone should make us suspect towards Hegel’s 
alleged retributivism. Nevertheless, for the moment let us discount Hegel’s later more 
consequentialist sounding comments and pretend “Abstract Right” includes all of 
Hegel’s remarks on punishment. How would punishment and desert look then, when 
read through the lens of personhood? In keeping with the generic features of 
personhood, Hegel tells us that desert cannot take into account particular features of 
criminality we usually think are essential in determining just sentences like the 
criminal’s intention, age, and degree of cognitive development (§99R).78 Desert also 
cannot consider particular consequences of the crime; it must treat like crimes alike even 
when they have dissimilar consequences; e.g., when one arsonist burns one building and 
another burns a whole neighborhood. Moreover, because judges (whether legal or some 
other kind) lack a principled basis by which to determine sentences, their sentences are 
contingent on whim. This is the real reason why in “Abstract Right” Hegel labels 
retributive punishment revenge (§102). It’s revenge because there is no guarantee that 
most persons will agree the sentence is just since the judge (and everyone else) lacks a 
shared principled basis to determine sentencing. Punishment, then, is just as likely to be 
considered an “infringement” of the criminal’s rights rather than something just (§101).  
                                                 
78 It might seem that Hegel is contradicting himself when he says abstract desert cannot take intention into 
account while simultaneously defining crime (or wrong) as the intentional violation of another’s right 
(§95). However, Hegel avoids contradiction because the definition of crime only employs intention in an 
abstract way (i.e., where intention is merely the willful violation of another’s right) whereas ethical life 
considers intention in a concrete way (i.e., the criminal’s particular motivation and aim).  
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  Both the positive and negative retributivist think desert is sufficient to make 
punishment just. Hegel’s account of personhood and desert seems to yield the same 
conclusion; because desert is correlated with personhood, and despite the fact that Hegel 
says little of justice proper in “Abstract Right,” it can be inferred that satisfying desert 
claims entails justice. However, Hegel does not regard personhood as a perfectly 
realized kind of freedom for it lacks a (1) a principled basis to determine itself and (2) 
access to a shared meaning which guarantees social stability. Personhood is, then, 
ultimately fraught with deep limitations, most notably its excessive formalism. So if 
Hegel’s theory of punishment is to have any purchase we must either accept his highly 
problematic account of abstract freedom in justifying punishment, which as we’ve seen 
appears highly unpromising, or look to later sections of The Philosophy of Right for 
different accounts of freedom and desert.   
Ethical Life and Social Desert 
 
Hegel outlines his highest conception of freedom in the “Ethical Life” section. Ethical 
life incorporates the positive component of “Abstract Right’s” notion of freedom, 
namely the capacity for reflection, while providing more particular (and universal) 
content to our understanding of freedom. In contrast, then, to abstract right’s protagonist, 
the person, individuals in ethical life manifest as social members.  
 In Hegelian language, abstract right’s notion of the “abstract universal” is to be 
contrasted with ethical life’s “concrete universal” (§§24,144).79 First, a note about the 
concrete. For, Hegel, the concrete is best understood through reference to particulars. 
                                                 
79 By “concrete,” Hegel also means actually existing.  
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Since individuals are not only abstract entities or persons - universally the same through 
their ability to distance themselves from all determinate content - but also particular 
beings with distinctive identities, tastes, values (i.e., with distinct reflectively endorsed 
moral principles), any adequate account of freedom must include room for these 
individualistic desiderata. Indeed, Hegel claims modernity’s greatest distinctive trait, in 
direct opposition to ancient Greece, is to safeguard and foster the individual’s freedom to 
be an individual; that is, modern individuals and governments input particularities into 
their definitions of freedom (§§124,153-157). Hegel makes clear though that taking 
particular values seriously also has its problems. For instance, it can lead to emphasizing 
the sovereignty of subjectivity, as when individuals are judged solely according to their 
“inward actions” or intentions (§106A). The idea here is that subjectivity construed as a 
purely voluntary state and therefore opposed to all actions which violate one’s voluntary 
state, is just as abstract (i.e., “one-sided”) as the freedom of personhood explicated in 
“Abstract Right” (§108).80  
Luckily, in “Ethical Life” when Hegel discusses the importance of particularity, 
it’s not in reference to this pure and abstract particularity, but, again, to the “concrete 
universal.” Thus, by mention of the term “universal” Hegel is not denoting pure 
subjectivity, but rather a relationship shared by many individuals within society. By 
fusing the term concrete to universal Hegel designates the distinctive kind of freedom 
characteristic of ethical life: individuals with particular identities (including subjectively 
                                                 
80 Hegel actually outlines the notion of freedom as subjectivity in the “Morality” section, which precedes 
“Ethical Life.” I mention it here under “Ethical Life” because it (1) is easier to grasp than abstract right 
and therefore needs less space to explain and (2) is more explicitly a core feature (i.e., subsumed) in 
ethical life.  
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endorsed values) stand in relation to others through the fact that shared relations inform 
and undergird individuals’ particular identities. Moreover, individuals are led to 
subjectively endorse the fact that their particular identities are universally shared through 
the process of education (Bildung) which the just modern institutions of the family, civil 
society, and the state, enable (§157)81; indeed what designates them as just is their ability 
to objectively instill proper moral education.82 Social members’ freedom is marked by 
recognizing and willing the fact that one’s particular identity depends on and is informed 
by one’s relation to others, what Hegel calls “being with oneself in an other.”83 All moral 
notions which carry any normative force in modernity must in turn reflect this structure 
of social freedom, the unity between particular and universal. Punitive desert is one such 
notion. Its particular content might include taking a poor thief’s situation into account 
when sentencing, the universality of which would be applying the same sentence to all 
poor thieves.84 Thus, insofar as social freedom presupposes the modern institutions that 
foster social freedom, desert, understood as a legitimate moral idea that unites the 
particular to the universal, in turn presupposes the same institutions. In other words, 
desert for Hegel is not prejusticial, but postjusticial: “The sphere of right…must have the 
ethical as [its] support and foundation.”85  
                                                 
81 See also the subsections “The Family,” “Civil Society,” and “The State.” 
82 Proper education establishes the platform upon which individuals share the interpretation regarding the 
messages of crimes and danger.  
83 See §7A, however I rely on Neuhouser’s translation of Beisichselbstsein in einem Anderen, not Nisbet’s 
or Knox’s. See Neuhouser, 19. 
84 Hegel discusses the need to take poor thieves’ economic situations into account in §127. His discussion 
there is a criticism of the abstract notion of desert for abstract desert cannot take economic situations 
seriously but sees all theft similarly. 
85 §141R Knox.  
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 Let us now reconsider the passages where Hegel appears to endorse 
consequentialism:  
[Legal stability] gives rise to the viewpoint that an action may be a danger to 
society. On the one hand, this increases the magnitude of the crime; but on the 
other, the power of society has become sure of itself, and this reduces the 
external importance of the injury and so leads to a greater leniency in punishment 
(§218). 
 
Hegel continues in the remarks: 
 
This quality or magnitude [of crime] varies, however, according to the condition 
of civil society, and this is the justification both for attaching the death penalty to 
a theft of a few pence or a turnip, and for imposing a lenient punishment for a 
theft of a hundred and more times these amounts (218R).  
 
Both passages deal with a concrete understanding (the magnitude) of crime, in 
opposition to an abstract understanding of crime. I say “concrete” because both consider 
crime in the context of society’s particular legal situation, which, (and this is the part the 
traditional retributivist will deny) directly informs the magnitude or seriousness of crime 
understood in its particularity (here, through comparative reference to legal stability and 
not, for example, the criminal’s intention, something equally worth referencing). It is 
obvious then that Hegel implicitly rejects the prejusticial notion of desert because the 
prejusticial notion claims that we can understand desert and crime irrespective of 
particular circumstances and irrespective of just social institutions. However here, Hegel 
assumes that social members understand punishment via shared terms (for otherwise 
society would be impotent in attaching any universal meaning to crime) and therefore in 
the correct way (and not as, say, revenge). Insofar as these shared terms are rational they 
take particularity seriously, a value dependent on and fostered by modernity’s just social 
institutions.  
 
  46
One might still wonder how these last comments of Hegel’s are consistent with 
his earlier more straightforward and apparently retributive theory of punishment. After 
all, doesn’t Hegel take two very different attitudes towards punishment in these two 
different sections of The Philosophy of Right? In reply, it is certainly true that Hegel says 
two different things regarding punishment in the “Abstract Right” and “Ethical Life” 
sections; however, Hegel’s attitude remains the same. Punishment’s nature as a just 
institution depends on a shared meaning of crime and that includes agreeing on which 
particular aspects of the crime (e.g., intention, direct and social effects) matter. Since 
morally shared meanings are impossible without the proper education, moral categories 
presuppose just social institutions. Thus, ascribing to Hegel the earlier apparently 
retributive view is incorrect. Hegel does not believe in the justice of traditional 
prejusticial retributivism, which he expresses in his critical remarks both in “Abstract 
Right” (which at first appears confusing because Hegel applies “Ethical “Life’s norms 
back onto “Abstract Right’s”) and “Ethical Life.” Readers intent on interpreting 
“Abstract Right’s” punishment as retributivist should be reminded that Hegel’s criticism 
of “Abstract Right’s” theory of personhood as the most substantial kind of freedom, 
applies as well to his view towards punitive desert. Again though, this is not to say 
Hegel rejects personhood or punitive desert in total. The rational aspects of these ideas 
are incorporated in Hegel’s later discussion of social membership (namely, the universal 
and reflective components). Since the rational aspects of desert are incorporated, Hegel 
is committed to upholding the retributivist criteria to bar punishment in excess of 
criminals’ desert. The rational aspects prohibit excessive punishment because they yield 
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the proportionate idea that punishment is the “negation of the [crime’s] negation” 
(§97A); universally because all crimes must be adequately (i.e., proportionately) 
addressed if freedom is to be made stable and reflectively because criminals can view 
their punishment as deserved only if it corresponds to their crime’s value. It is in this 
sense, that Hegel’s view is expressivist; punishment expresses to rational subjects the 
enforcing of legal norms, not the violation of another’s rights. Hegel is a negative 
retributivist in the further respect that he grants courts and political leaders the right to 
pardon and excuse offenders (§127, 282), not because desert-based punishment is always 
just, as Schild seems to suggest (for such desert could be construed prejusticially).86 
However, barring these kinds of considerations, Hegel does think it the duty of courts to 
respond to wrongs via punishment. Hegel seems to leave room though for non-
incarcerating forms of punishment when he describes punishment as a “cancellation” 
and “counter-example” to crime’s false messages (§§99, 218A).87   
 
E. Concluding Remarks 
 
Retributivists intent on punishing according to a prejusticial notion of desert encounter 
practical problems like determining how the grounds to punish can be agreed upon in the 
absence of just institutions, epistemic problems like determining how individuals are 
warranted (mean the same thing) in their desert claims, and moral problems when they 
                                                 
86 Schild also notes that Hegel makes pardoning legitimate. Wolfgang Schild, “The Contemporary 
Relevance of Hegel’s Theory of Punishment,” 172-73. Schild suggests though that pardoning is an act 
distinct from justice proper (something only the monarch who stands outside justice can grant) and he does 
so for obscure metaphysical reasons. Whether or not this is wholly correct according to Hegel, on my 
interpretation, pardoning is consistent with justice because justice never requires incarceration.  
87 Hegel seems to imply that non-incarcerating forms of punishment are acceptable when society is secure 
and therefore that the “meaning” of individual crimes is innocuous.  
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seem to endorse ignoring the particularities of the crime. Hegel’s punitive theory 
corrects these deficiencies by rejecting prejusticial desert while remaining tied to an 
expressive theory of punishment as well as upholding the morally attractive negative 
retributivist criteria of making desert punishment’s upper limit. Hegel’s theory also 
seems to have the morally attractive feature of permitting non-incarcerating forms of 
punishment like explicit state-endorsed moral condemnation (insofar as such 
condemnation is an obvious “counter-example”). To those skeptical of making desert 
dependent on factors like legal stability for fear of diluting the steadiness of desert in the 
face of historical change, I can only appeal to intuition. Surely a seemingly minor crime 
that threatens legal stability is not minor. And although it is possible to conceive actually 
minor crimes as undermining legal stability (like littering), it is obviously unlikely to 
actually occur.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
OUTLINE FOR A HOLIST PUNITIVE THEORY 
 
In the last chapter, I showed that, for Hegel, desert is a dynamic moral concept, which 
can incorporate many different elements (e.g., the criminals’ intentions and his crimes 
consequences). I also argued that Hegel’s punitive view is a negative retributivist theory 
that rejects the prejusticial conception of desert. Having established these two claims 
though, it is worth further pondering the relationship between making desert judgments 
and justice. I do just this in two major steps. First, I draw upon contemporary holist 
theory. “Holism” is the view that stresses prior standards of justice in determining an 
individual’s deserts. Samuel Scheffler maintains that holism is not relevant to all aspects 
of desert, however, but is limited to desert of economic resources. Second, and in 
contrast to Scheffler, I contend that holism is equally pertinent to punitive desert. In 
developing my argument, I employ principles derived from Jean Hampton’s and Hegel’s 
punitive theories, which give strong evidence in support of punitive holism.  
 
A. Scheffler’s Asymmetrical Holism 
 
Scheffler defines economic holistic theories as asserting, 
 
that the justice or injustice of an assignment of economic advantage to a given 
individual always depends on the justice, as judged by some prior standard, of 
the overall distribution of benefits and burdens among people.88  
 
Scheffler contrasts holism with absolute and proportional desert theories. Absolute 
desert theory maintains, “for each person there is an absolute level of advantage that the 
                                                 
88 Samuel Scheffler, “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” in Desert and Justice, ed. S. Olsaretti 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003) 69-92, at 81. 
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person deserves to be at.”89 Accordingly, justice “consists in giving each person what he 
or she absolutely deserves.”90 To illustrate, consider Bill who absolutely deserves sixty-
six gold stars for his performance on a school project. This means that irrespective of 
what others deserve (and irrespective of how others are treated), Bill still deserves sixty-
six stars. It is worth noting that absolute desert corresponds to what we earlier called 
noncomparative justice. Recall, Feinberg defines noncomparative judgments as claiming 
that a person’s “rights-or-deserts alone determine what is due him.”91 For 
noncomparative judgments, as in absolute desert, the object of desert (i.e., the number of 
gold stars) is “fixed independently of what other people deserve.”92  
By contrast, proportional desert theory employs comparative judgments.  
 
This view asserts that each person deserves a share of total resources that is 
proportional to his or her relative effort or productivity, and that justice requires 
distribution in accordance with individual desert so understood. [It also 
maintains] that an individual’s just allotment is just if it is the allotment that the 
individual would receive in a just overall allocation.93  
 
Comparative judgments enter here via the “total resources” available which each 
individual compares to him or herself, thereby implicitly comparing him or herself to all 
others. Comparative judgments are not, however, the distinguishing mark of proportional 
desert theory; after all, we make use of such judgments without necessarily supposing 
proportional constraints, for instance when awarding prizes in a contest.94 Instead, 
                                                 
89 Shelly Kagan, ‘Equality and Desert’, in What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and Desert, ed. L.P. 
Pojman and O. McLeod (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 298-314, at 300.  
90 Scheffler, “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” 83.  
91 Feinberg, “Noncomparative Justice,” The Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 297-338, at 300.  
92 Scheffler, “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” 83.  
93 Ibid., 83. 
94 Feinberg, 299. Awarding prizes is distinct from proportional theory insofar as most contests do not 
assume the prize should be proportionately distributed.  
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Scheffler notes, proportional desert theory’s salient feature is its assertion that an 
“individual’s actual allotment is just if it is the allotment that the individual would 
receive in a just overall allocation.”95 To illustrate this feature, consider the following: 
Bill and Sally are working on a joint assignment and each will be awarded a proportion 
of ninety-nine gold stars depending on their effort.96 Suppose Sally works twice as hard 
as Bill. This means she should receive sixty-six stars and he thirty-three. However, 
proportional desert theory maintains that Sally is treated justly if she receives sixty-six 
stars no matter what Bill receives. So if, for instance, there’s a star shortage and Bill only 
receives ten stars, but Sally still receives sixty-six, then proportional theory maintains 
Sally is nevertheless treated justly because it is the allotment she “would receive in a just 
overall allocation.”97  
 Despite their differences, absolute and proportional desert theories both retain the 
traditional definition of justice employed by Feinberg: “Justice consists in giving a 
person his due.”98 By contrast, holistic theories reverse the traditional definition: Desert 
consists in giving a person what justice gives him, what justice defines as desert. This 
reversal though has one qualification: According to the holist, we cannot arrive at a 
judgment about the justice of allocating a benefit to a particular individual without also 
taking into account “considerations about the justice or injustice of the overall 
distribution of benefits that obtains.”99 If, then, the overall allocation is unjust, then an 
individual cannot be said to deserve some X. This is what I mean by the holistic reversal: 
                                                 
95 Scheffler, “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” 83.  
96 This example is Scheffler’s. See “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” 83.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Feinberg, “Noncomparative Justice,” 298.  
99 Scheffler, “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” 84. 
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desert rides piggyback on justice.100 So, to use the gold star example yet again: If the 
overall distribution of gold stars is considered just at two stars per student and, indeed, 
each student has two stars, then giving Bill sixty-six stars because he deserves it is not 
only unjust, but conceptually incorrect. It is conceptually mistaken because, according to 
the holist, desert is nothing more than assigning an individual the two stars that satisfy 
the prior just distribution. Hence, if someone makes a desert claim that appears distinct 
from referencing the just distribution, then a likely response might be: “Are you sure you 
know what desert is?”  
 At this point, the following objection is anticipated: But why should we adopt a 
holistic theory of desert? After all, aren’t the absolute and proportional theories more in 
line with our intuitions? Can’t we say an individual deserves something even if the 
overall allocation is unjust?  
 This objection is serious and any holist must at some point deal with it. Luckily, 
for the purposes of this chapter, I think a full reply is unnecessary because my aim is not 
to refute absolute or proportional desert theory, but to merely argue that there are strong 
reasons in favor of adopting a punitive holist theory. So I will simply presume that while 
the intuitions behind the absolute and proportional theories are reasonable, so are the 
following holist intuitions: (1) Persons have equal moral worth and justice denies 
treating some people as having greater intrinsic worth than others. (2) Economic 
                                                 
100 Scheffler notes that both utilitarianism and Rawlsian accounts of distributive justice are holistic. 
Utilitarianism is holistic insofar as individuals are said to deserve an advantage only if that assignment is 
part of an overall distribution that maximizes utility. Rawlsian accounts are holistic insofar as individuals 
are said to deserve an advantage only if that assignment is part of an overall distribution “generated by 
social institutions that are regulated by Rawls’s two principles of justice.” Scheffler, “Distributive Justice 
and Economic Desert,” 81-82.  
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distribution concerns the “proper division of social advantages,” with the “things that 
people are presumed to want.” (3) In modern society people’s material resources are 
limited to the extent that it is impossible to satisfy the demands for such resources. (4) 
People’s “lives are profoundly structured by their common participation in a complex 
network of social, political, and economic institutions”101 which establish and regulate 
social cooperation. Thus, as a result of the “empirical” premises, (2) allocation of 
benefits, (3) material scarcity and (4) economic interdependency, holists maintain that 
any allocation to some persons “may affect the supply available to others.”102 Hence, all 
four intuitions foster the holist principle that “it makes no normative sense to assess the 
justice of an allocation of resources to any one individual in isolation,”103 without first 
considering all persons’ resources within the given distribution.  
 Critics of holism may further object that economic holists are committed to 
holism in all ethical cases, not just economic ones. Full-fledged holism, they might 
think, is unacceptable because it would mean completely abandoning our intuitions 
regarding “prejusticial desert.” Prejusticial desert designates the view that desert is 
meaningful outside of or prior to justice as well as well the view that desert judgments 
can be made without referencing background conditions.104 Traditionally, theorists have 
marked punitive desert as a type of prejusticial desert. Therefore, critics of holism might 
                                                 
101 Scheffler notes the first and last two intuitions in “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” 82. He 
mentions the second in “Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory,” California Law Review 88(2000); 965-90, 
at 986. 
102 Scheffler, “Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory,” 986. 
103 Scheffler, “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” 82. 
104 In Chapter III I defined prejusticial desert more broadly as the view that desert is meaningful outside of 
or prior to justice. Thus, I did not include the part, mentioned here, that prejusticial desert is also marked 
by its lack of reference background conditions. From now on, by prejusticial desert, I mean this fuller 
definition. 
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think that insofar as economic holists are committed to full-fledged holism (which 
includes punitive holism), holism must be rejected because it requires giving up 
prejusticial punitive desert. It is unclear, however, why economic holists are committed 
to full-fledged holism. It is certainly conceivable to be a holist concerning a specific 
domain, but not others. In this respect, Scheffler notes, John Rawls provides an example. 
Rawls maintains an “asymmetrical” stance towards holism, upholding holism in the 
economic case, while denying it in the punitive case.105 Although Rawls never fully 
accounts for his asymmetrical position, Scheffler defends Rawls by arguing the premises 
economic holists’ cite do not obtain in the punitive case. As we saw above, such 
premises include material scarcity, the allocation of benefits, the interdependency of 
persons, and the intuition that economic desert is meaningful only in, as opposed to 
outside of or prior to, just distributions. The economic holist is not committed to punitive 
holism because punishment does not distribute benefits (punishment is obviously a 
burden, not a benefit) nor does punishment concern punitive scarcity (“the supply of 
punishment may be assumed to exceed people’s demand that they themselves be 
punished”).106 As far as the critics’ prejusticial intuition, Scheffler notes that prejusticial 
punitive desert is legitimate because “wrongful action would be wrong even if it were 
not illegal,”107 that is, even it were outside of justice. Indeed, judgments of punitive 
desert “are related in a particularly intimate way to those reactive attitudes whose role in 
                                                 
105 Scheffler, “Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory,” 988. Rawls’s asymmetrical position is inferred from 
sections 17 and 48 in A Theory of Justice where he discusses desert.  See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).  
106 Ibid., 986. 
107 Ibid., 987. 
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the thought of responsible agents we are supposing to be effectively ineliminable.”108 
Here “ineliminable” is meant to convey the fact that prejusticial punitive desert 
corresponds to the reactive attitude of resentment, which is aimed at someone or some 
institution for the breaching of a normative expectation. Since the reactive attitudes are 
constitutive of moral subjectivity itself and therefore not tied to institutions, judgments 
of prejusticial punitive desert are legitimate;109 to deny them would deny a central 
feature of moral subjectivity, namely, resentment. 110 These points strongly suggest that 
economic holists need not be committed to full-fledged holism because they can uphold 
prejusticial desert in the punitive context.  
 
B. Punitive Holism 
Now, certainly the first two reasons Scheffler cites in arguing that economic holism is 
not committed to punitive holism are correct: (1) economic holism governs benefits, not 
burdens and (2) economic holism, unlike punitive holism, concerns material scarcity. 
Because, then, economic holism considers factors that do not pertain in the punitive 
case, economic holism does not entail punitive holism. The economic holist simply cites 
a different class of reasons than the punitive holist (and indeed, Scheffler does not even 
cite hypothetical premises in support of punitive holism). Here, I do not dispute these 
                                                 
108 Scheffler, “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” 75. My italics. 
109 Scheffler himself does not explicitly use the term “legitimate” to describe prejusticial punitive desert. 
However, I attribute to him this view because he clearly thinks moral responsibility (with which punitive 
desert is bound up within) is prejusticially legitimate.  
110 Scheffler makes clear, though, that just because he thinks the nature of desert is fundamental to moral 
responsibility and therefore legitimate, does not commit him to the view that the institution of punishment, 
which expresses this reactive attitude, is legitimate. Scheffler, “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” 
76. 
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two premises and the conclusion they yield: that economic holists are not necessarily 
committed to punitive holism. Interestingly, however, Scheffler provides us with a third 
reason in favor of his conclusion and it is this reason that I want to now examine and 
criticize. Scheffler’s third reason in favor of his conclusion is: (3) because punitive 
desert corresponds to the reactive attitude of resentment, an attitude fundamental to and 
constitutive of moral responsibility itself, desert is a legitimate prejusticial concept. 
Because I have already granted Scheffler’s claim that economic holists are not 
committed to punitive holism, my contention with (3) is isolated from Scheffler’s overall 
argument. Instead, and through drawing on both Jean Hampton’s and Hegel’s punitive 
theories, I argue that, contrary to Scheffler, punitive desert’s moral legitimacy presumes 
actually obtaining just social norms and just social institutions, which desert judgments 
must reference. Therefore although economic holism may not bind us to punitive holism, 
punitive holism is still morally attractive. 
Hampton’s Holistic Desert Structure 
 
Given that Chapter III begins with the claim that Hampton endorses prejusticial desert, 
my plan to now discuss how Hampton’s punitive theory contains insights that support 
holist principles may appear contradictory. After all, isn’t prejusticial desert opposed to 
holism? It is true that holism’s definition rules out accepting prejusticial desert and it is 
also true that Hampton’s endorses prejusticial desert. Consider her claim that, 
“retribution [desert] is a response to the damage to value implicit” in wrongfulness, or, 
value-denying action. 111 Here no mention of justice or just institutions is made. 
                                                 
111 Hampton, “Correcting Harms and Righting Wrongs,” UCLA Law Review, Vol. 39, 1992, 1685. 
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Nevertheless, I think discussing Hampton’s theory in the context of holism makes sense, 
and, more importantly, provides strong reasons in favor of adopting punitive holism, 
even though Hampton herself might not have endorsed holist conclusions.  
Before proceeding, though, first recall Scheffler’s definition of holism:  
The justice of any individual’s share depends on the justice, as judged by some 
prior standard, of the overall allocation of which it is actually a part.112  
 
Now, I am going to make a distinction between those who interpret this definition 
strictly, let’s call them “conservative holists,” from those who interpret it less strictly, 
“liberal holists.” What determines whether an interpretation is strict, and therefore 
conservative, is if it concentrates on the term “justice.” The conservative holist then bans 
anyone entry to the conservative holist club if they fail to designate that the X prior to 
desert is justice. By contrast, the liberal holist refrains from using the language of justice, 
but nevertheless maintains the structure of holism’s definition: The desert of any 
individual depends on the X, as judged by some prior standard, of the overall allocation 
of which it is actually a part. In other words, the liberal holist accepts anyone’s usage of 
desert so long as it includes the commitment to referencing a prior X where X is taken to 
be a reasonable distribution.  
It is this second type of holism, the liberal kind, which Hampton appears to 
employ. This implicit endorsement of holism is evident in the following point regarding 
punishing sexual offenders:  
                                                 
112 This a slightly modified definition of the one used earlier in the paper. Scheffler, “Distributive Justice 
and Economic Desert,” 84.  
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When the present day Canadian courts use a sentencing policy that gives certain 
types of sexual offenders lighter sentences, on average, than those given to 
people who have been convicted of burglary, they are accepting a view of 
women that grants them standing similar to  - but slightly lower than – mere 
objects. 113
 
Hampton’s point here is not simply that because sexual offence is more serious than 
burglary, it is unjust to punish sexual offenders less severely than burglary. Hampton is 
also making the stronger, more holistic, assertion that our judgments that sexual 
offenders deserve harsher punishment base themselves off a prior standard of punitive 
distribution. So, for instance, if burglary usually receives a sentence of X time, then, 
because sexual offence is more serious than burglary, sexual offence must receive a 
significantly harsher sentence than X in order to reflect its serious status. In other words, 
forming correct desert judgments requires consulting other crimes’ standard sentencing 
guidelines. If, then, like the Canadian courts, we punish sexual offenders less harshly 
than other, say, non-violent criminals, it is likely that properly morally constituted 
persons will think we misjudged the case. Such persons will recognize that we have 
misunderstood the principle of proportionality (i.e., the idea that wrongdoer’s deserve a 
punishment in proportion to the nature of their crime), presuming, that is, that we accept 
it (as most modern legal institutions and subjects generally do). Hampton’s discussion of 
the Canadian courts makes clear that the proportionality principle is legitimate only 
insofar as it references an actual consistent standard that assigns crimes (though not 
necessarily the crime in question) specific punishments. This standard then serves as the 
reference point for correct desert judgments, a standard that, in the case of the Canadian 
                                                 
113 Hampton, “Correcting Harms and Righting Wrongs,” 1692.  
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courts, is overlooked.114 As a result, these courts’ desert judgments are incorrect, and 
punishment cannot properly express the victim’s and wrongdoer’s value, which as we 
saw in Chapter II, Hampton argues is the whole point behind retributive punishment.  
Hampton’s criticism of Canadian courts reflects and makes explicit the intuitive 
appeal of liberal holism: The problem with disregarding the overall distribution of 
punishment in a society is that it unhinges our desert judgments from their proper 
meaning. Crimes like burglary are assigned lighter sentences because they are less 
serious than other crimes. Therefore, to punish a serious crime like sexual offence less 
severely than burglary is to express, falsely, that sexual offence is not serious business. 
And because correctly expressing our desert judgments requires referencing a standard 
of punitive distribution that upholds the principle of proportionality (which is what 
makes the distribution just), Hampton’s theory picks up on a common holist intuition 
that many of us already hold (as the Canadian court example indicates).  
 Hegel’s Holistic Desert Structure 
 
Hegel’s theory of social freedom reveals yet another plausible and highly attractive 
holist principle. Before discussing this principle, however, it is necessary to recall from 
Chapter III that Hegel thinks forming desert judgments requires considering factors like 
                                                 
114 It is also a consequence of Hampton’s implicit holism that there is no crucial moral difference between 
countries’ sentencing guidelines so long as they punish proportionately (within reasonable limits). So, if 
Canada punishes sexual offence for X years and the US punishes it for X + 10 years, but each punish 
sexual offence in proportion to less serious crimes, then Hampton’s implicit holism commits her to 
maintaining that each countries’ sentence for sexual offence is legitimate. This is something many 
theorists writing on Hampton ignore because they think it is inconsistent with classical retributivism. See, 
David Farnham, “A Hegelian Theory of Punishment,” 13. It is misguided, however, to say that she’s 
inconsistent because Hampton never claims to be classically retributivist as is extremely evident when she 
says that under the right conditions, giving the victim a parade could be a retributive punishment. See, 
“Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs,” 1696. Furthermore, these non-classical retributivist 
examples are consistent with Hampton’s theory if her theory is read through the implicit holism that I 
think she endorses. Linda Radzik pointed this out to me.  
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the criminal’s economic background, intentions, and the consequences his crime effects 
(in essence, factors relevant to the particular criminal) and that the capacity to consider 
such particularities is acquired only under just social conditions; for it is only under such 
conditions that individuals are educated to value the relevant particularities. In essence, 
then, Hegel maintains a postjusticial view of desert. However, a postjusticial desert view 
is not the same thing as a holistic desert principle. The former says that proper desert 
judgments presuppose that just social conditions obtain.115 The latter demands that in 
order to determine whether a particular desert judgment is just, one is required to 
reference some prior X where X is taken to be just. One might think, though, that 
Chapter III’s assessment of Hegel’s postjusticial view has already shown that Hegel’s 
theory contains a holistic desert principle: the X in Hegel’s theory simply is the set of 
just institutions which foster social members’ capacity to form proper desert judgments 
and their judgments are just insofar as they reflect the guiding principle behind those 
institutions (where the principle is the “concrete universal” idea, or, the respect for and 
fostering of particularities and universals). I think that this is correct. However, I think it 
is a mistake to call this principle holistic simply because it is too general. It is too 
general because the X in this case, the just social institutions, do not themselves have 
any direct conceptual relation to desert. To see this more clearly, consider again 
Scheffler’s holistic definition:  
                                                 
115 It is worth mentioning here that a merely postjusticial desert view leaves room for either an absolute or 
comparative conception of desert. To employ Scheffler’s Sally example: Sally deserves sixty-six gold stars 
no matter what anyone else receives (the absolute view); Sally deserves sixty-six gold stars if she works 
twice as hard as Billy (the comparative view). Both absolute and comparative conceptions of desert, then, 
lack reference to a prior just distribution. 
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The justice or injustice of an assignment of economic advantage to a given 
individual always depends on the justice, as judged by some prior standard, of 
the overall distribution of benefits and burdens among people.116  
 
Here it is plain that “the overall distribution of benefits and burdens” (the background X) 
is conceptually related (as an economic concept) to “the assignment of economic 
advantage to a given individual” (the desert judgment). So on Scheffler’s view, holism 
means relating a particular class of desert (here, economic) to the same class of 
background condition (economic distribution). This is why I think it is a mistake to say 
that Chapter III’s analysis of Hegel yields a holistic principle. There we only saw that 
Hegel thinks just desert presupposes and reflects an array of just social institutions, none 
of which are specifically punitive. Hence, so far we have not seen that Hegel lends any 
support to holism. So, if we are going to encounter any evidence in favor of a Hegelian 
holism, we must extend our examination of Hegel beyond Chapter III’s discussion of 
what just desert looks like and the core institutions that make it possible (the family, 
civil society, and the state) to one that takes explicitly punitive background conditions 
seriously.  
It is here that Hegel’s discussion of legal publicity and legal education comes 
into play. Recall that in Chapter III we mentioned that desert judgments cannot be based 
on whim (for whim is indicative of abstract not social freedom) but must be shared (i.e., 
be made universal) and have a principled basis. I did not mention there, however, that 
the shared and universal component of desert is given a recognized and stable form in 
the legal code (§219), which, through being made publicly visible, all citizens come to 
                                                 
116 Samuel Scheffler, “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert,” at 81. 
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know (as opposed to just professional judges) (§§224, 221A,). Furthermore, since the 
law is publicly visible and all citizens are educated in it, they see it as rational. That is, it 
is deemed rational because it conforms to the principle of ethical life, the concrete 
universal, which means it is written so as to take considerations like economic 
background, intention, and the crime’s effects (how much the crime upsets legal 
stability) into account (§§127, 227, 218A).  
At this point we can derive the following holist principle from Hegel: A 
particular punitive desert judgment is just only when it conforms to a legal code (the 
background X) and, furthermore, that legal code conforms to the principle of social 
membership, the concrete universal, which all citizens recognize and identify as rational. 
This holist principle then fills in and develops Hegel’s postjusticial view of desert 
discussed in Chapter III, according to which just desert is operative only under just 
social conditions. For now we also know that making just desert judgments requires 
more than actually obtaining just social conditions. It is further required to consult the 
legal code, which all social members deem rational.  
Like Hampton’s holistic principle, I think the Hegelian derived holist principle is 
attractive because it is strongly intuitive. The intuition it draws upon is that it is simply 
not enough to hold private desert judgments. Our desert judgments must be principled 
and stable. Thus, they seem truly legitimate only when all idealized moral agents also 
share them through a mediated rational structure like a legal code.  
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C. Concluding Remarks 
Scheffler claims that punitive desert, unlike economic desert, is legitimately prejusticial. 
Hampton and Hegel each provide strong reasons for rejecting Scheffler’s claim. 
Hampton shows that desert judgments are morally offensive when they ignore a 
proportionate distribution of punishment. To say a sexual offender deserves a light 
sentence is offensive because the distribution of punishment (the background condition) 
punishes (or is supposed to punish) according to how serious the crime is, or, the 
principle of proportionality (the standard which makes this condition just). Thus, in 
order to make a moral desert judgment, it is necessary to consult the prior distribution 
and model one’s one judgment after it. Hegel’s argument for the necessity of consulting 
the prior distribution (the legal code in Hegel’s case) is somewhat different. He shows 
that desert judgments must be based off a stable and rational legal code (distribution). A 
stable legal code is necessary to ensure that particular desert judgments are shared and 
therefore not contingent. A rational legal code is necessary for social members to 
reflectively endorse its particular desert judgments; that is, they endorse them because 
the code to which they belong mirrors the principle of social membership, the concrete 
universal. It is this last requirement, that all social members reflectively endorse their 
rational juridical system, which serves as Hegel’s justification for the legal code itself 
(the prior standard which justifies the distribution). The morally attractive upshot to both 
of these derived holistic principles is that they make intuitive the fusion between the 
epistemological and the moral: We cannot make an accurate desert judgment unless we 
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also know (1) that it belongs to a system of some kind, which (2) is in turn deemed either 
moral (for Hampton) or rational (for Hegel).  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
It seems useful to now recap how I arrive at my project’s conclusion in favor of punitive 
holism. Chapter II examined Hampton’s retributive theory, which employs both 
noncomparative and comparative types of justice. I argued that although Hampton 
provides evidence that proportionate punishment comparatively responds to the victim 
and wrongdoer, she does not indicate how it noncomparatively restores the victim and 
wrongdoer.  Chapter III begins by observing that, unlike most retributivists, Hampton 
employs desert as a comparative idea: how much punishment someone deserves depends 
on how much their crime elevates them above their victim. However, like traditional 
retributivists, Hampton employs a prejusticial conception of desert, or, the view that 
desert is meaningful outside of or prior to justice. I spend the rest of the chapter 
examining Hegel who, like Hampton, thinks punishment performs an expressive 
function and that desert is essentially comparative. However, in contradistinction to 
Hampton, Hegel rejects prejusticial desert. Desert is legitimate only after just social 
conditions obtain and individuals are properly morally educated to have a shared and just 
understanding of it. I think Hegel’s idea of postjusticial desert is attractive because it 
jibes with the intuition that just societies stabilize and actualize moral concepts. Chapter 
IV further pursued the idea of what just desert looks like. First, I examined Samuel 
Scheffler’s theory of holism, the view that desert’s legitimacy lies in referencing a prior 
just distribution. I then argued against Scheffler’s asymmetrical stance that, unlike 
economic desert, punitive desert is legitimately prejusticial (where now prejusticial 
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means non-holist and not simply non-postjusticial) by employing principles derived 
from Hampton’s and Hegel’s theories. Hampton’s implicit holism is contained in her 
view that the moral accuracy of desert judgments lies in their referencing the prior just 
(i.e., proportionate) distribution of punishment. Hegel’s implicit holism is contained in 
his view regarding the publicity and education of law. For Hegel, desert judgments are 
legitimate only when they are legally codified and when all citizens are educated to 
recognize the just nature of law (it’s just because it to conforms the principle of social 
membership). These derived holistic principles seem intuitively attractive in two ways. 
First, they fuse the epistemological to the moral: Accurate moral desert judgments must 
reference a prior punitive distribution scheme, which all citizens deem just. Second, 
these principles unite deontological and consequentialist intuitions by understanding 
desert, a characteristically deontological concept, through the distributive scheme (via 
law’s proportionate sentences or law itself) and societal context (via how properly 
constituted persons view the messages implicit in crime and punishment or the effect 
crime has on legal stability) in which it’s meaning is established and changes.  
 To further pursue this project would most likely entail arguing for the stronger 
and much more difficult claim that the major non-holist punitive theories are either 
ethically misguided or implausible. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I will be 
content if I have shed light on punitive holism’s moral appeal.  
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